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Abstract
Is the pricing of sovereign risk linear during bearish episodes? Or
can initial shocks on economic fundamentals be exacerbated by en-
dogenous factors that create nonlinearities? We test for nonlinearities
in the sovereign bond market of European peripheral countries dur-
ing the debt crisis and explain them. Our estimates based on a panel
smooth threshold regression model during January 2006 to September
2012 show four main findings: 1) Peripheral sovereign spreads are sub-
ject to significant nonlinear dynamics. 2) The deterioration of market
conditions for financial names changes the way investors price risk of
the sovereigns. 3) The spreads of European peripheral countries have
been priced above their historical values, given fundamentals, because
of amplification effects. 4) Two CDS indices on financial names unam-
biguously stand out as leading drivers of these amplification effects.
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1 Introduction
From the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, the decade-long
process of interest rate convergence in the euro-area reversed. Two distinct
categories emerged, the peripheral and the core euro-area economies. Aside
from Greece, the sharp rise of peripheral sovereign bond spreads and their
volatility are hard to reconcile with the underlying economic fundamentals:
spreads surged suddenly, while the economic conditions were deteriorating
gradually1. We consider the hypothesis that amplification dynamics have
driven sovereign risk during the crisis. Initial shocks on economic funda-
mentals may have been exacerbated by endogenous mechanisms. Is pricing
of sovereign risk linear, or can we identify endogenous factors of amplifica-
tion? The answers will help to monitor and price sovereign risk and to curb
financial fragmentation.
There is now extensive theoretical research suggesting that the pricing
of assets, including sovereign debt, may be nonlinear. Recent work stresses
the importance of nonlinear effects and amplification dynamics through the
price mechanism during financial crises (Brunnermeier and Oehmeke, 2009).
On the one hand, the initial drop in asset prices will be exacerbated if it trig-
gers fire-sale liquidations driven by the deterioration of the mark-to-market
portfolio value. Theory suggests that relatively small shocks can imply large
spillover effects (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Moreover, Brock et al.
(2009) show that proliferation of hedging instruments may produce non-
linear systems and destabilize markets. Here we test whether the credit
derivatives market has amplifed the risk instead of mitigating it.
Previous empirical work has identified non-linearity in the spread deter-
mination model for euro-area peripheral sovereigns during the crisis (Aizen-
1In Spain, for example, the public debt amounted to less than 60% of GDP even by
end 2009. The Italian primary budget surplus implied that if interest rates had stayed
low, only modest fiscal adjustment would have been necessary to service the debt. Even
invoking a broader set of economic fundamentals seems insufficient to explain the sudden
eruption of the crisis. Unemployment and the trade deficit had been increasing gradually.
And Ireland’s trade balance had been improving at the time of the crisis.
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man et al. (2011), Gerlach et al. (2010), Montfort and Renne (2012),
Borgy et al. (2011), Favero and Missale (2011)). Two different regimes have
been described, a crisis and a non-crisis regime, with additional fundamental
factors important in the crisis regime. These papers usually attribute non-
linearities to the fiscal situation: they find that yield spreads have become
much more sensitive to fiscal imbalances after 2008, with a deterioration of
fiscal indicators generating a significant widening of the spreads after 2008.
But the crisis may have other than fiscal roots. Attributing nonlinear dy-
namics only to fiscal imbalances, an exogenous driver, is questionable in the
light of recent advances in macro-finance.
In this paper, we draw on recent research on financial crises to explore
the endogenous drivers of nonlinearities in the sovereign bond markets of
euro-zone peripheral countries. We explicitly test three hypotheses. First,
we hypothesize that the nexus between sovereigns and banks observed dur-
ing the crisis (Gennaioli et al., 2010, Huizinga and Demirguc-Kunt, 2010,
Acharya and Steffen, 2013) may have created a nonlinear relationship which
goes both ways and features some amplification in the sovereign risk. Sec-
ond, adverse liquidity effects on euro area banks have been documented dur-
ing the crisis, including a significant fall of interbank loans after mid-2010
(Allen and Moessner, 2013). So we will examine the effects on sovereign
risk of a negative externality due to fire-sale liquidation of assets by test-
ing whether liquidity shocks have had self-reinforcing effects on sovereign
bonds. Third, we explore the hypothesis that derivatives produce nonlinear
systems (Brock et al. 2009, Simsek, 2013) by investigating the effects on the
sovereign price of credit default swaps (CDS), the most active credit deriva-
tive market. Delatte et al. (2012) and Palladini and Portes (2011) have
documented an adverse influence of the sovereign CDS on the underlying
bond pricing when bearish investors use these instruments to express their
views on the sovereign credit. But we know much less about the effects of
corporate CDS on sovereign risk. In a down-cycl,e however, their effect on
the cash market may feed back to the sovereign risk. To explore this hypoth-
esis, we focus on synthetic CDS indices which cover default risk on various
pools of corporate entities, because their standardization and liquidity make
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them the instrument chosen by investors to express views on market seg-
ments. We test whether a rise in corporate CDS spreads amplifies the risk
of sovereigns. We compile a new set of financial variables that capture our
three hypotheses, and we identify the best candidates explaining how initial
shocks to fundamentals may be amplified.
Amplification can be modeled through increasing weights in the spread
determination. In other words, the same change in a fundamental has a
higher impact on the spread in the crisis period than it had previously. To
capture this idea, we use the smooth transition regression model initially
proposed by Terasvirta (1996) and developed in panel by Gonzalez et al.
(2005). Contrary to the alternative family of nonlinear models, the Markov-
switching (MS) models, STR model offers a parametric solution to account
for nonlinearity by allowing the parameters to change smoothly as a func-
tion of an observable variable (MS specifications assume that the transition
variable is unobserved). In this paper, we consider potential threshold vari-
ables to account for the time variability of the estimated coefficients, and we
follow Gonza`lez et al. (2005) to identify the optimal threshold variable. In
sum, our panel threshold regression framework establishes a ranking among
three hypotheses that might give rise to amplification effects (Fouquau et
al. 2008).
We estimate equations for the sovereign spreads of five European periph-
eral countries: Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Greece over the period
January 2006 to September 2012. We deliberately end our sample at the
beginning of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme that
has succesfully narrowed the spreads and blurred market signals2.
Our estimates uncover four main findings. First, sovereign spreads are
subject to significant nonlinear dynamics, a result that invalidates linear
estimations of the sovereign spreads during this period. Second, the tests
2As Paˆris and Wyplosz (2013) have argued, ”Spreads no longer show us what investors
think about debt sustainability. They reflect a mix of debt-sustainability expectations
and forecasts of ECB reactions”.
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reveal that uncertainty and stress on financial entities are major drivers of
nonlinearities. The deterioration of market conditions for financial names
changes the way investors price risk of the sovereigns. Third, we detect
amplification effects in the spreads of the five peripheral countries, with
heterogeneous dynamics, that our PSTR approach enables us to capture.
Last, two CDS sub-indices on financial entities are leading drivers of nonlin-
earities. Their linearity rejection statistics are unambiguously higher than
the twenty-two alternative variables. This result may stem from the high
leverage created by these instruments. It seems that when active investors
leverage their views on credit risk in the financial sector, this drives down
the price of sovereigns. The financial risk feeds back to peripheral countries
through CDS indices. This result suggests that sovereign bond investors and
policymakers should carefully monitor the financial credit derivative mar-
kets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the determinants of the sovereign bond spread in a linear context and the
theoretical arguments for the presence of nonlinearities. Section 3 reviews
the existing empirical evidence of nonlinearities in the pricing of sovereign
bonds during the European debt crisis. Section 4 introduces the PSTR
specification methodology and the test procedure. Section 5 summarises our
dataset, and Section 6 discusses the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Determinants of Sovereign Bond Spreads
Linear context
The government bond yield spread represents the risk premium paid by
governments relative to the benchmark government bond. The empirical
literature has explored a large set of macroeconomic variables to explain
sovereign spreads3. From a theoretical perspective, although sovereign debt
is notably different from corporate debt, these instruments can be priced
3Early and influential empirical papers include Edwards (1986), Eichengreen and Portes
(1989), Cantor and Packer (1995).
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by decomposing the risk premium into credit risk and liquidity risk, a well-
established distinction in the corporate context (Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995), Duffie and Singleton (1999)).
Credit risk is influenced by variables that affect the sustainability of
the debt and the likelihood of repayment. For a sovereign entity, these
are macroeconomic variables determining internal and external balances,
more precisely variables important in determining the budget deficit and
the current account. The empirical evidence in the euro area context sug-
gests that significant determinants include fiscal variables, activity-related
and competitiveness-related variables (see Attinasi et al. 2009, Haugh et al.
2009, De Grauwe and Ji, 2012).
Liquidity risk is related to the size of the issuer, with an expected nega-
tive relationship due to larger transaction costs in small markets. In contrast
with findings on credit risk, empirical evidence is mixed about the pricing
of a liquidity premium in the sovereign bond spread4.
Beyond these two theoretical risk premia, the growing influence of global
factors on domestic financial conditions shown in recent work (Rey, 2013)
points to the potential influence of international risk aversion. Borgy et
al. (2012) find a significant impact of international risk aversion on the
sovereign bond yield spread in the euro-area context.
While the spread determination model is assumed to be constant and
linear in most studies, there is now substantial theoretical research sug-
gesting that the pricing process of assets, including sovereign debt, may be
nonlinear. In the following we review the different arguments to guide our
empirical exploration in the subsequent sections.
4For example, Geyer et al. (2004) finds that liquidity plays a minor role for the pricing
of EMU government yield spreads. Favero et al. (2009) find that investors value liquidity,
but they value it less when risk increases.
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Theoretical arguments for nonlinear pricing of sovereign bonds
In the European sovereign crisis, we may observe a feedback loop between
sovereigns and the banking sector, which may imply nonlinearities in the
pricing of sovereign bonds. On the one hand, Gennaioli et al. (2010) argue
that the sovereign risk affects the banks through their exposure to sovereign
bonds. Huizinga and Demirguc-Kunt (2010) provide evidence in a large
cross-country sample that bank CDS spreads responded negatively to the
deterioration of government finances in 2007-08. Acharya and Steffen (2013)
find that the Eurozone banks actively engaged in a ’carry trade’ in the crisis
period, increasing their exposure to risky sovereign debt. On the other hand,
bank risk affects the sovereigns, which are expected to bail out systemically
important institutions (Acharya et al. , 2011). That represents a significant
risk given the size of banks compared to the size of the public backstop.
We hypothesize that the nexus between banks and sovereign creates a
nonlinear relationship which goes both way and features some amplifica-
tions. Bernanke et al. (1999) show that an adverse shock to the economy is
amplified through the credit channel. The resulting weakening of the econ-
omy may affect the sovereign risk in a nonlinear manner. This is more likely
to happen when a shock on financial intermediaries forces them to restrict
the quantity of credit, and that weakens the economy5. This reduces fis-
cal revenues and raises sovereign risk, which leads to a deterioration of bank
balance sheets. Recently, Coimbra (2014) has explicitly modelled the result-
ing feedback loop. After a rise in sovereign risk, the banks’ VaR constraint
binds, which reduces their demand for sovereign bonds, thereby raising the
sovereign risk premium. This in turn leads to adverse sovereign debt dy-
namics, which raises sovereign risk. The initial shock is exacerbated and
feeds back to credit conditions. Borrowing costs deteriorate further, causing
more credit restrictions. Highly-leveraged investors are more vulnerable to
initial shocks and forced into credit restrictions to a greater extent.
5From 2010, US prime money market funds have strongly reduced their exposure to
euro area banks and stopped lending to banks from peripheral countries (IMF, 2012b)
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Although this model admits of quantification that supports the theory,
we do not yet have a model of simultaneous determination of sovereign and
bank risk that is amenable to econometric specification. In this work, we
will explicitly test whether the rise in the risk of the banking sector amplifies
the sovereign risk.
In addition, there are specific pricing mechanisms that may drive nonlin-
earities in the sovereign bond market. The most documented such mecha-
nism is due to liquidity problems implying self-amplifying dynamics in asset
prices, because of the negative externality due to fire-sale liquidation of as-
sets6. An initial shock on sovereign bonds may trigger a liquidity spiral
because it degrades the quality of collateral7. Banks facing liquidity prob-
lems will be forced to sell off assets to regain liquidity or restore their capital
ratio. The emergence of asymmetric information frictions strengthens the
dynamics (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). The pricing of debt becomes more
”information sensitive”, and safe assets become less safe, so investors are
more selective about the quality of assets they accept as collateral. Their
demand for the sovereign bonds that are perceived to be more risky declines,
thereby raising the sovereign risk premium. So there is a liquidity spiral: a
falling sovereign bond market leads financial intermediaries to fly to liquid-
ity, and this amplifies the effects of the initial price reduction. Relatively
small shocks can cause liquidity suddenly to dry up, leading to a major
correction of asset prices (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). In this work,
we will test a second hypothesis, that liquidity shocks have self-reinforcing
effects on sovereign pricing.
6Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) initially pointed out this
externality.
7As an example of a fire-sale driven by more restrictive collateral requirement, the
Financial Times reports in November 2010 ”[...] a sell-off in Irish bonds was driven by a fire
sale of positions by market participants who were unable to meet collateral requirements
enforced by LCH.Clearnet- one of Europe’s biggest clearing houses [...]. Ireland’s banks
were faced with an estimated $1bn cash-call from LCH.Clearnet as a result of its decision
to require a deposit of 15 per cent against all Irish bond positions as an indemnity against
default.”
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Finally, we explore the hypothesis that derivatives produce nonlinear
systems, and a proliferation of hedging instruments may destabilise markets
(Brock et al., 2009, Geanakoplos, 2010, Simsek 2013). Using credit deriva-
tives, investors can hedge the credit risk of a reference entity and also express
negative credit views more easily than with cash assets. Short sales of credit
instruments can be executed with reasonable liquidity and a lower risk of
suffering from a short squeeze (Tavakoli, 2008). In the corporate sector,
where the liquidity in the cash market is sometimes limited, Blanco et al.
(2005) and Baba and Inada (2009) have shown a lead for CDS prices over
credit spreads in the price discovery process, implying that bearish investors
who express their negative views on certain entities trigger self-reinforcing
dynamics. Up-front principal is small or zero in most derivatives, implying
that these instruments create high leverage. We know from Adrian and Shin
(2010) that high leverage enhances the amplification of the initial correction.
Thus by offering a new technology allowing bearish investors to express their
negative views, credit derivatives amplify the effect of an initial correction
on a market segment (Geanakoplos, 2010). Although we have evidence that
the sovereign CDS market influences the underlying sovereign bond pric-
ing during bearish episodes (Delatte et al. 2012, Palladini and Portes, 2011,
and references cited there), we know much less about the effects of corporate
CDS on sovereign risk. In a down-cycle, their effect on specific corporate
markets may affect the sovereign because of the resulting weakening of the
sector activity, thereby reducing fiscal revenues and potentially giving rise
to counter-balancing expansionary fiscal measures that further deteriorates
the fiscal balance. This is more likely to happen in corporate sectors with a
large contribution to the domestic output and/or a large employment share,
or in the financial sector because of the nexus between banks and sovereigns
described before.
Given this background we explore the link from corporate CDS spreads
to the sovereign spreads and test a third hypothesis: that the rise in corpo-
rate CDS prices has amplified the risk of sovereigns.
There are various theoretical reasons why the pricing of sovereign bonds
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may be nonlinear. In the following we briefly explore the empirical evidence
of nonlinearities in the pricing of sovereign bonds during the European debt
crisis.
3 Empirical evidence of nonlinear sovereign bond
spreads during the European debt crisis
Non-linearity in the spread determination model of peripheral members of
the euro-area during the crisis has been seen in previous work (Aizenman
et al. (2011), de Grauwe and Ji (2013), Gerlach et al. (2010), Montfort
and Renne (2011), Borgy et al. (2011), Favero and Missale (2012)). Two
different regimes have been described, a crisis and a non-crisis regime, with
additional fundamental factors important in the crisis regime.
Montfort and Renne (2011) model the joint dynamics of euro-area sovereign
yields with a Markov-switching specification and find a regime-switching fea-
ture at the origins of the large fluctuations during the crisis. In particular,
they identify a crisis regime that captures the rise in volatility experienced
by the sovereign bond market since 2009.
Borgy et al. (2011) examine the macroeconomic determinants of risk
premia in the sovereign yield spreads of six euro-area members and give
special emphasis to fiscal sustainability measures. They show a structural
break in the relationship between sovereign spreads and fiscal determinants
in 2008: spreads have become much more sensitive to fiscal imbalance mea-
sures after 2008, so a given deterioration of the debt service ratio generates
a significantly larger widening of the spreads after 2008. Overall the risk
perception has changed during the sovereign crisis, with the deterioration
of fiscal balances gaining a major role after 2008. This result underlines the
increasingly important constraint on fiscal policy imposed by the financial
markets, an observation of Haugh et al. (2009), who similarly find that
incremental deteriorations in fiscal performance have led to larger increases
in the spreads of euro area countries after 2008.
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These empirical papers have detected nonlinearity in the sovereign bond
spread determination model of euro-area members. The models employed
in these papers reveal nonlinear dynamics on the weights of fiscal factors
but do not explain the sources of nonlinearity. The regime shifts are due
to an unobservable variable. Our objective is to relax linearity and allow
the spread determination model to change according to an observable signal
that sets off amplifying spirals. The next Section presents our empirical
strategy.
4 Empirical strategy: specification and estimation
We estimate sovereign bond spread determination using a panel smooth
threshold regression (PSTR) model developed by Gonzales et al. (2005).
The choice of panel data is motivated by the low time dimension of macroe-
conomic data. The PSTR model allows us to characterize nonlinearity as a
function of an observable variable. More precisely, the sovereign spread can
be estimated as follows:
Sit = µi + β
′
1Xit + β
′
2Xitg(qit; γ, c) + uit (1)
for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T where µi represents individual fixed effects,
Xit is a set of variables that capture credit risk, liquidity risk and interna-
tional risk aversion and uit are i.i.d. errors. g(.) is a continuous transition
function bounded between 0 and 1. We use a logistic function of order 1
that has an S shape:
g(qit; γ, c) =
1
1 + exp [−γ(qit − c)]
, γ > 0. (2)
where qit is the observable threshold variable. The γ parameter determines
the smoothness, i.e., the speed of the transition from one regime to the
other, and c the location parameter, which shows the inflexion point of the
transition. The higher the value of the γ parameter, the faster (i.e., sharper)
the transition. This specification allows a smooth transition between two
extreme regimes defined by the vectors β′1 and β
′
1 + β
′
2. For example, if
we take a threshold variable that proxies flight to liquidity, the higher this
proxy, the closer the coefficient gets to β′1 + β
′
2. The PSTR model is a way
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to account for individual heterogeneity (Fouquau et al., 2008).
The estimation of the PSTR model consists of several stages. In the first
step, a null hypothesis of linearity is tested against the alternative hypoth-
esis of a threshold specification. Then, if the linear specification is rejected,
the estimation of the parameters of the PSTR model requires eliminating
the individual effects, µi, by removing individual-specific means and then
applying nonlinear least squares to the transformed model (see Gonza`lez et
al., 2005).
In the Gonza`lez et al. (2005) procedure, testing linearity in a PSTR
model (equation 4) can be done by testing H0 : γ = 0 or H0 : β0 =
β1. In both cases, the test is non-standard since the PSTR model contains
unidentified nuisance parameters under H0 (Davies, 1987). The solution
is to replace the transition function, g(qit; γ, c), with its first-order Taylor
expansion around γ = 0 and to test an equivalent hypothesis in an auxiliary
regression. We then obtain:
Sit = µi + θ0 Xit + θ1 Xitqit + ǫ
∗
it. (3)
In these auxiliary regressions, parameter θ1 is proportional to the slope
parameter γ of the transition function. Thus, testing linearity against the
PSTR simply consists of testing H0 : θ1 = 0 in (3) for a logistic function
with the usual LM test. The corresponding LM statistic has an asymptotic
χ2(p) distribution under H0.
Before proceeding to the estimation, we present our data.
5 Data description
In this Section we present our dataset and sources used to estimate the lin-
ear model of sovereign bond spreads and to construct the threshold variables
that capture the forces described in Section 3.
The estimation of the model of Eq.(4) is subject to two major data
constraints. On the one hand, macroeconomic fundamentals have a low fre-
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quency (annual, quarterly or monthly), while our financial data are daily.
Therefore we transform all series to monthly data. We calculate the monthly
average of the daily series and we transform quarterly to monthly using a lo-
cal quadratic transformation with the average matched to the source data8.
On the other hand, the sovereign crisis started in late 2009, and the Out-
right Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme implemented in September
2012 succesfully narrowed the spreads and blurred market signals. So we
have only three years during which the hypothesized transition might have
occured. Therefore, to obtain a sufficient number of observations, our esti-
mation is based on a balanced panel of the five peripheral European countries
in which the sovereign yield has been most under pressure (Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Spain and Portugal) between January 2006 and September 2012.
Determinants of the sovereign bond spread
Our dependent variable is the sovereign bond spread, which prices the de-
fault risk of a country. It is defined as the difference between the sovereign
bond yield and the risk-free rate of the same maturity. For each country
in the sample, we use the long-term German yield, which is the benchmark
risk-free rate for the Euro area (Dunne et al., 2007), and the government
yield of this country at the same maturity. We rely on daily observations
of 10-year bond yields provided by Bloomberg, from which we compute a
monthly average9. All data described in this Section are plotted in Figure 1.
A key choice is the set of explanatory variables included in Xt in Eq (4).
As mentioned in Section 1, we need variables to capture credit risk, liquidity
risk and international risk aversion. We test the following variables: debt-
to-GDP ratio, deficit, unemployment, unit labor cost, risk, liquidity.
First, the country’s credit risk is traditionally related to fiscal sustain-
ability. We include the debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal deficit from Eurostat.
We add the squared value of the debt-to-GDP ratio to capture non-linear
dynamics that might be due to threshold effects of sovereign debt on real
8We used Eviews software for this transformation.
9For Ireland only 8-year bond yields are available, so we computed the spread using
the 8-year German yield.
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growth. The fiscal data are revised data, necessary because of the presence
of Greece in the sample, although these are not the data initially observed
by market participants. Other relevant variables are economic activity and
the country’s competitiveness. We proxy economic activity using the unem-
ployment rate rather than GDP to avoid collinearity with the debt-to-GDP
ratio. The unit labor cost and trade balance are included to proxy the coun-
try’s competitiveness10.
Second, we include a variable for liquidity risk, proxied as the bid-ask
spread of the dependent variable and alternatively measured by market size,
as the country’s share of total outstanding Euro-denominated long-term gov-
ernment securities issued in the Euro zone. Data are available on a monthly
basis from the European Central Bank (ECB).
Third, we include the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) as a measure of in-
ternational risk aversion, because it is often considered by many to be the
world’s premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility (e.g.,
Rey, 2013).
Last we control for the effect on peripheral spreads of non-standard mon-
etary measures adopted by the ECB during the crisis. In May 2010, the ECB
decided to start the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) with large securi-
ties purchases in order to address tensions in certain market segments11. We
use the amount of securities held for monetary purposes (divided by 100),
as shown in the ECB’s weekly financial statements, and including Securities
Market Program, 1st and 2nd Covered Bond Purchase Programs (available
in ECB Statistical Data Warehouse)12.
10All data are available at a quarterly frequency, except for unemployment (monthly)
and fiscal deficit (annual).
11The SMP was terminated in September 2012 in favour of Outright Monetary Trans-
actions (OMTs) in sovereign secondary bond markets.
12On the other hand, the ECB provided in December 2011 and March 2012 more than
1 trillion Euros of additional liquidity to the financial system with the very longer-term
refinancing operations (LTRO). Unfortunately publicly available data are not broken down
by country, which makes the inclusion of the data composed of two observations irrelevant
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Endogenous drivers of nonlinearities, three hypotheses
We construct a set of financial data to capture our three hypotheses pre-
sented in Section 2. They represent the set of threshold variables that we
will include alternatively in our nonlinear estimations in the next Section.
All threshold variables are plotted in Fig. 2.
1. Feedback loop from banks to sovereigns
In order to test if the rise in the risk of the banking sector amplifies
the risk of sovereigns, we create indicators of uncertainty and stress in
this sector.
• IVolbank used in Hakkio and Keeton (2009) denotes the idiosyn-
cratic volatility of bank stock prices. It serves as an equivalent
of the VIX for the banking industry rather than for the corpo-
rate sector as a whole. It is computed as the standard deviation
of residual returns from a CAPM regression using an aggregate
European banking sector price index and the S&P Europe 350
taken from Datastream.
• CMAXFin is an indicator of stress widely used by market pratic-
tioners to identify periods of extreme price declines (Patel and
Sarkar (1998)). We take the five domestic banking stock in-
dices from Datastream and calculate CMAXFin as the maxi-
mum cumulated index losses over a moving two-year window with
Cmaxt = 1−
Pt
max[Pt−24...Pt]
. The more bearish the market, the
closer to 1 the indicator.
• An additional useful indicator of stress in the banking system is
the Euribor-OIS spread, calculated as the difference between the
Euro Interbank Offered rate and the overnight indexed swap rate.
This indicator must be taken with some caution because of the
alleged manipulation of the Euribor rate.
We control for an overall effect of uncertainty and stress not due
to the banking sector by including indicators on non-financial
in our panel estimates.
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sectors:
• Vstoxx is the European equivalent of the VIX, considered by
many to be the leading measure of market volatility13 .
• FTSE300 and S&P350 denote the return of the European aggre-
gate stock market indices
• DomsticIndex is the matrix of the domestic stock returns in-
dices of the five countries in our panel (PSI, IBEX, ATHEX,
FTSEMIB, ISEQ).
• RvolGerm captures bond market volatility using the 10-year Ger-
man government bond index. It is the realized volatility com-
puted as the monthly average of absolute daily rate changes.
• Rvol Nonfi is the realized volatility of domestic non-financial sec-
tor stock market indices taken from Datastream.
• Rvoldoll, Rvolyen and Rvolpound are the realized volatility of
three bilateral euro exchange rates for the US dollar, the Japanese
yen and the British pound respectively.
2. Nonlinear effects of credit derivatives:
In this paper we focus on the most active credit derivatives, the credit
default swap market (CDS). In particular, a significant development
has been the creation of synthetic CDS indices which cover default
risk on a pool of entities as opposed to single-name CDS. Buying an
index is equivalent to selling protectin. Therefore buying and selling
the indices can be compared to buying and selling portfolios of bonds.
A buyer takes on the credit exposure to the bonds, i.e. is exposed
to defaults, similar to buying a cash portfolio. Investors can express
views on a specific market segment via CDS indices. The main ad-
vantages of these new classes of credit derivatives are standardization
and liquidity, which explain their growth. CDS indices accounted for
43% of gross notional amount of the CDS market in December 2012,
13We use Vstoxx to proxy the European market volatility, while we use VIX to capture
international risk aversion.
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up from 20% in 2004 (Vause, 2011)14.
We take the i-Traxx Europe, a broad tradable credit default swap
family of indices traded by Markit. Most widely traded is i-Traxx
Europe Main index (125 investment grade credits), further segmented
into sub-indices defined by industry groups and trading levels. We
include:
• i-Traxx Europe comprises the most liquid 125 CDS referencing
European investment grade credits
• X-over comprises the most risky 40 constituents
• HiVol is a subset of the main Europe index consisting of what
are seen as the most risky 30 constituents
• SenFin comprises constituents from the sector of senior-financials
and SubFin from the sector of sub-financials.
3. Negative externality due to fire-sale liquidiation
We use standard indicators of flight to liquidity complemented by in-
dicators of flight to quality and asymmetry of information because
they occur simultaneously during a liquidity run and strengthen self-
amplifying dynamics (as put in Section 2).
• Aaa/10-year Treasury spread denotes the spread between Euro-
pean corporate bonds rated Aaa and the 10-year German Trea-
sury bond. It is a standard measure of liquidity premium, because
even the highest-rated corporate bonds tend to be less liquid than
Treasury securities. All corporate bond indices are Markit i-boxx
European corporate bonds, taken from Datastream.
14CDS trading has continued to grow after 2007 (IOSCO, 2012). At the end of 2012, the
gross notional value of outstanding CDS contracts amounted to approximately 25 trillion
US dollars, and the corresponding net notional value to approximately 2.5 trillion US
dollars. The fact that the gross notional value of the CDS contracts has more than halved
since the peak of 2007 (with 60 trillion US dollars) is mostly attributed to the development
of compression mechanims that eliminate legally redundant contracts (Vause 2011).
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• High-yield bond/Baa spread denotes the spread between ”junk
bonds”, i.e. bonds with too low a rating to be considered investment-
grade, and Baa-rated corporate bonds, the lowest-rated bonds
considered as investment-grade. High-yield bonds are issued in
smaller quantities and traded by a limited set of investors (in-
stitutional investors are banned from the market) in comparison
with Baa-rated bonds, implying a liquidity premium to compen-
sate investors for holding the less liquid asset.
• 10-year swap spread. The fixed-rate payment leg of a swap is
expressed as the Treasury yield plus a spread that compensates
investors for the fact that claims on fixed-rate payments are con-
siderably less liquid than Treasury securities.
These variables also capture flight-to-quality because they all in-
clude a default risk premium. In addition, the indicator High-
yield bond/Baa spread captures also asymmetry of information,
because a rising value partially stems from adverse selection prob-
lems when investors have difficulty in determining which bonds
are riskier than others during financial crisis episodes (Hakkio
and Keeton, 2010).
• Flight to quality is also proxied with the indicator StockbondsCorr
which measures the correlation between domestic stock total re-
turn indices and the total return German Treasury index. It
is well-documented that the correlation between stock and gov-
ernment bond returns is usually significantly negative during fi-
nancial crises, because investors consider government bonds safer
(Andersson et al. 2008). We compute the correlation over rolling
three-month periods using the domestic stock index of each coun-
try of our panel and the 10-year German government bond index
taken from Datastream. We use the negative values of the corre-
lations, so that an increase in the measure corresponds to higher
flight-to-quality.
• The asymmetry of information is also measured using cross-section
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dispersion bank proposed in Hakkio and Keeton (2010) and com-
puted as the cross-section dispersion of bank stock returns to
capture uncertainty about the relative quality of banks. The in-
tuition is that the larger the cross-section dispersion, the larger
proportion of returns is unexpected, so the larger the information
asymmetry. It is calculated using daily data on the S&P Europe
350 and the stock prices of the 82 largest commercial banks in
terms of market value15.
It is worth making a general comment looking at the set of threshold
variables plotted in Fig. 2 : most variables experienced a first peak during
the subprime crisis, followed by a second peak due to the sovereign debt crisis
in Europe. Thus our financial series capture two episodes of crisis, contrary
to our dependent variable, which is mostly affected by the second episode.
This pattern represents a methodological challenge to detect the drivers of
nonlinearity during the European crisis. In the following, we present our
results.
6 Estimation results: Nonlinear dynamics in the
European sovereign market.
We recall that the PSTR specification of the spread is as follows:
Sit = µi + β
′
1Xit + β
′
2Xitg(qit; γ, c) + uit (4)
for i = 1, ..., n and t = 1, ..., T, X represents the vector of determinants,
µi the country fixed effects, g(.) the threshold function, qit the threshold
variable, γ the smooth parameter, c the location parameter.
15More precisely we estimate a CAPM regression of the daily return on each bank’s stock
index against the daily return on the S&P Europe 350 index, using data for the previous
12 months. The estimated coefficients are then used to calculate the forecast errors of the
current month. Last we calculate the interquartile range for these residuals in order to
keep the central 50%. The lower the interquartile value, the smaller the dispersion across
banks.
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Selection of the optimal linear model
First, we proceed to the linear estimation using a panel estimation with
fixed effects. The first step is to select the optimal linear model. We use al-
ternative series in the vector of explanatory variables and select the optimal
combination based on standard selection criteria. Results displayed in Table
1 suggest that our specifications are robusts with similar estimated values
in different specifications. The information criteria suggest that specifica-
tions 1 and 2 could both be considered as optimal (Schwarz = 0.207, AIC
= 0.197), and we keep specification 2 which is the most parcimonious.
With a negative and a positive coefficient respectively, the evolution of
the sum of Debt and squared Debt is ambiguous, while trade balance is
not significant. In turn, as expected, unemployment and international risk
aversion have an upward impact on the spread: a rise in unemployment
and in the VIX increase the sovereign spread. Liquidity effects are properly
captured by our measures based on the bid-ask spread (an increase in the
bid-ask spread increases the sovereign spread) and volume (a reduction of
outstanding issues increases the spread). We keep both in the vector of de-
terminants because information criteria are systematically better when both
measures are included.
In addition, as in other studies (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012, Wyplosz, 2013),
we find that competitiveness is not relevant: the unit labor cost has an un-
expected sign (higher labour cost reduces the spread) while the trade deficit
is never significant.
Last, in all specifications the unconventional monetary measures adopted by
the ECB have a slight significant effect.
In the following we adopt a parsimonious approach and proceed to the
tests and nonlinear estimation of specification 2.
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Linearity tests: the feedback loop played a significant role
In the second step, we test this linear specification of the spread (spec 2)
against a specification with threshold effects. We select the best threshold
variables, with the objective of identifying the drivers of nonlinear effects.
As suggested by Gonza`lez et al. (2005), the ”optimal” threshold variable
corresponds to the variable that leads to the strongest rejection of the lin-
earity hypothesis.
The linearity test results reported in Table 2 clearly reject the null hy-
pothesis of a linear relationship, regardless of which threshold variable is
included in the specification. The remarkably high level of rejection in most
models makes the presence of nonlinear dynamics unambiguous. This is
consistent with previous empirical work mentioned above and confirms that
it is inappropriate to use linear models to estimate sovereign spreads during
this period.
The ranking of the test statistics reveals that the feedback loop hypoth-
esis unambiguously stands out (CmaxiFi, Euribor-OIS and IVolBank reject
linearity with 194.2, 119.4 and 116.2 resp.). Second, two CDS indices com-
posed exclusively of financial constituents CDSSnrFin and CDSSubFin rank
among the highest rejection statistics (148.3 and 130.9 resp.).
In sum, the tests reveal that investors are sensitive to the risk in the
banking sector, and this triggers nonlinear dynamics. The pricing model is
a nonlinear function of fundamentals, where the weight of these fundamen-
tals varies with the risk of banks (we examine the evolution of the estimated
coefficient below). The deterioration of market conditions for banks changes
the way investors price risk of the sovereigns. It is interesting to observe that
indicators of uncertainty about the non-financial sector, rvol NonFin and
rvol Germ, rank among the last with low statistics (39.5 and 30.4 resp.).
These results illustrate how deeply the sovereign debt crisis is intertwined
with the banking crisis (Lane, 2012). This pattern is confirmed with the
financial CDS indices, which price the risk on financial entities. It is inter-
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esting to observe that CDS are not only a good measure of risk but short
positioning vehicles used by investors to express their views on credit. Their
strong rejection statistics may not only confirm the feedback loop hypothesis
but also indicate an adverse influence of these instruments on the sovereign
risk. We discuss this below in the reported estimates.
The hypothesis about adverse liquidity effects does not get much empir-
ical support. Most indicators of such effects included in our model get low
rejection statistics in comparison with first-ranked indicators analyzed pre-
viously (see column 1-3 in Table 2). This result suggests a major difference
between the US subprime and the European debt crises: while flight to liq-
uidity and quality and asymmetry of information are unambigously relevant
factors of amplification in the subprime crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2012)16,
our estimates suggest that such concerns have played a minor role during the
European debt crisis, in comparison with the banking sector’s balance-sheet
effects and the subsequent feedback-loop dynamics to the sovereigns.
Last the tests reveal that the volatility of different market segments
play a minor role in nonlinear dynamics. While the volatility of FTSE and
S&P get a fairly high rejection statistics (111.8 and 111.6), other volatility
measures such as Vstoxx do not confirm the effect of overall volatility (LM=
64.2). This suggests that aggregate equity indices correlate with bank stocks
indices and thus convey a similar information. Last, volatility of the foreign
exchange market is not a relevant factor of nonlinearity (rvol Pound, rvol
Doll and rvol Yen get 49.5, 40.0 and 43.9 resp) because intra-Euro zone,
not extra-Euro zone capital transfers have been relevant since 2010 (IMF,
2012a). Peripheral countries have suffered massive capital flight back to the
core countries, resulting in monetary fragmentation of the euro-zone. But
the aggregate external position of the eurozone has not deteriorated signifi-
cantly.
In the last step of our empirical investigation, we examine more precisely
16Gorton and Metrick (2012) have documented spillovers and endogenous responses of
other market participants due to concerns about market liquidity in the Fall of 2008.
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the impact of these variables on the determination of sovereign spreads.
We consider which determinants have their weight changed most when the
identified drivers of nonlinearity deteriorate.
Estimation results: a rise in the risk of CDS financial subindices
amplifies the sovereign risk
Table 3 reports the linearity test statistics, the smooth parameter, γ, the
location parameter c and the residual sum of squares in the three specifica-
tions that best reject linearity.
The optimal specification is the one in which CmaxFi is the threshold
variable because it rejects linearity with the highest statistics (Gonza`lez et
al., 2005). In addition, this threshold variable minimizes the information
criterion (Schwarz : -0.485 versus -0.267 and -0.140 for CDSSnrFin and
CDSSubFin respectively). In this specification the smooth parameter is
high (γ = 111.4), implying a sharp transition between two extreme regimes.
This variable CmaxFi captures the heterogeneity in our sample. In fact,
Italy, Spain and Portugal remain exclusively in the first regime (in these
countries CmaxiFi is always lower than the estimated location parameter
c = 0.819 as shown in Fig 2, graph Cmax Financials), while Ireland and
Greece went from the first to the second regime (47 and 12 observations re-
spectively as shown in Fig 2). Heterogeneity is confirmed in the other spec-
ification including an individual threshold variable, Ivol Bank, with similar
patterns: the transition is sharp ( γ = 141.0), and only Ireland and Greece
went from the first to the second regime (27 and 12 observations respectively
as shown in Fig 2, graph Ivol Bank).
Therefore, while the five peripheral countries are usually gathered in
the same bundle, our estimates suggest that their spreads have a different
dynamics. This finding leads us to split our sample into two sub-samples,
one including Italy, Spain and Portugal, the other Greece and Ireland. The
smaller sub-sample still has 162 observations, which is sufficient for reason-
ably precise and stable estimates.
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We re-estimate the model using the three previous threshold variables
in each sub-sample (Table 4). Linearity is strongly rejected again, but the
sub-sample estimates indicate a different ranking from the full sample. In
fact, in both samples, CDSSnrFin and CDS Sub-Fin best reject linearity
(LM =88.2/82.8 and 67.3/61.9 resp), while CmaxFi ranks lower. This re-
sult confirms that the individual variable CmaxFi was mostly capturing
heterogeneity in our previous estimates (as probably was IvolBank). In
turn, CDSSnrFin and CDS Sub-Fin, which are two homogeneous variables,
account for the time-instability in the spread determination model. In other
words, the prominent driver of nonlinearity in the bond determination model
is the price of a corporate CDS index that covers financial names. Now we
examine the evolution of the coefficients to identify whether amplification
effects have affected the spreads. To do so, we adopt a general-to-specific
modelling approach where we eliminate non-specific variables based on their
statistical significance and the Schwartz information criterion.
Italy, Portugal and Spain
Results in Table 5 report the estimated coefficients in regime 1 and regime 2
(βˆ1 and βˆ1+ βˆ2) of the bond spread determination models of Italy, Portugal
and Spain, in which CDSSnrFin and CDS Sub-Fin are threshold variables.
We examine the transition of the estimated coefficients along the CDS in-
dices variation. Table 5 indicates that the transition from the first to the
second regime is sharp (γ = 53.7) and the threshold value, c, represent-
ing the switching date of the transition process, is located in autumn 2010.
Our model thus correctly captures the increase in market tensions about
the European sovereigns in 2010 after the Greek crisis broke. The spread
determination model for these countries appears to have changed radically
in autumn 201017. Recall that amplification can be modeled through in-
creasing weights in the spread determination.
17In the alternative model γ = 2.18 which corresponds to a sharp transition too, see
Table 5.
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In fact, our estimates suggest amplification effects that operate in regime
2 through a stronger influence on the spread of all macroeconomic determi-
nants: debt, fiscal balance and unemployment as well as the international
risk aversion (| βˆ′1 + βˆ
′
2 |>| βˆ
′
1 |). In other words, when the price of the
sub-index iTraxx CDSSnrFin deteriorates and exceeds 135.7 bp, the weight
of these fundamentals increases in the determination model, so the shocks
to fundamentals have more effect on the bond spread. In turn, the influence
of liquidity is ambiguous because the coefficients of both variables capturing
liquidity show two contrary movements in regime 2 : we find a stronger
negative influence of the relative stock of outstanding debt (implying that a
deterioration of liquidity affects the spread more in regime 2 than in regime
1), while the influence of the bid-ask spread is lower in the second regime
(| βˆ′1 + βˆ
′
2 |>| βˆ
′
1 |, implying that a rise in the bid-ask spread affects the
spread less in regime 2). In addition, we observe that the sign on unit labor
cost is contrary to the expected sign, as in the linear estimates (see Ta-
ble 1)18. Last, we observe that the influence of the SMP program has not
changed during the crisis and remains slight.
To check the robustness of our estimates, we proceed to alternative esti-
mates. First, overall amplification effects are confirmed when Cmax Fin is
used as a threshold variable in an alternative specification (see Table 6)19.
Second, financial CDS and sovereign bonds may price the same informa-
tion, which would raise an endogeneity bias due to simultaneity. To address
this, we re-estimate our optimal model by lagging the threshold variable.
Linearity is rejected with a similar statistic (LM = 63.2 versus 62 in the
core estimate), and amplification effects are confirmed. Last, we check that
our nonlinearity finding does not result from omitting the CDS index as an
explanatory variable. Our results are not affected by the introduction of
18As in the linear estimates, models excluding this variable have a lower RSS, so we
decide to keep it in the vector of explanatory variables.
19We observe that the combined influence of debt and squared debt increases in regime
2 as well as the weight of fiscal balance and unemployment. Only the influence of VIX,
which is found to be stable, differs from the core estimate.
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the CDS index in the specification, a result that confirms that this variable
nonlinearly affects the sovereign bond pricing20.
Greece and Ireland
Results of the second sub-sample including Greece and Ireland are reported
in Table 7. The slope parameter is low (γ = 0.43), and this transition occurs
in autumn 2010, consistently with the previous sub-sample21.
Amplification effects also operate through a stronger influence of unemploy-
ment. The effects of debt and squared debt are contradictory and compen-
sate for each other. The effects of the VIX and of the bid-ask spread are
positive, as expected, but they remain stable in the second regime, contrary
to the previous sub-sample. As in the previous sub-sample and in the linear
estimate, the unit labor cost has the same unexpected sign. Last, contrary
to the previous sample, we observe that the SMP has a negative effect on the
spread in the second regime (βˆ′1+βˆ
′
2 < 0). In other words, our estimates sug-
gest that the bond purchases carried out by the ECB have counterbalanced
amplification effects on the bond spreads of Greece and Ireland. Similarly to
the previous panel, we have proceeded to alternative estimates displayed in
Table 8. Model 1 confirms the stronger influence of debt and unemployment
and indicates a stronger influence of liquidity, a result not uncovered in the
core estimates. The downward influence of the SMP is confirmed too.
Thus the spread determination model changed during the crisis, and am-
plification effects are detected in both sub-panels, where initial shocks on
fundamentals are exacerbated when the price of financial CDS sub-indices
increases. The higher the CDS price, the more risk-averse are investors to-
wards the peripheral countries. Figure 2, which plots the evolution of both
20Results available on request.
21The lower slope parameter may indicate a slower transition than in the previous sub-
sample but it is also important to note that the transition speed depends on γ and the
distance between the threshold variable and the threshold parameter c. The fact that CDS
indices increase strongly during the crisis implies that the transition from one regime to
the other is fairly fast, as in the other sub-sample.
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financial CDS sub-indices, shows that their prices experience a first peak
due to the subprime crisis and then rise progressively to reach a second
peak, significantly higher in 2012, when peripheral sovereign risk holdings
of European banks put the entire euro system at risk.
We mentioned in Section 2 that high leverage enhances the amplification
of the initial correction. Recall that the up-front principal in buying CDS in-
dices is small or zero, implying a high leverage created by these instruments.
Market anecdotal evidence reports that from May 2010, some traders have
taken positions on the i-Traxx Financials to leverage their views on credit
risk in the financial sector due to rising sovereign risk22. Our results sug-
gest that this has reinforced the risk of sovereigns because the financial risk
feeds back to the peripheral countries through CDS indices. We conjecture
that the large amplification effects detected by our model result from high
leverage created by CDS indices and their late introduction into the mar-
ket. In the context of the subprime crisis, Geanakoplos (2010) stresses that
the late introduction of standardized CDS contracts into the mortgage mar-
ket in 2005 precipitated its downturn because the derivatives allowed the
pessimists to leverage their credit views23. Similarly, it is interesting to ob-
serve that standardized CDS contracts on European corporate names were
introduced in 2008 when Markitt launched the Europe i-Traxx index. The
implication was that bearish investors had an opportunity to leverage after
the market reached a peak, which magnified the depression of financial name
prices in the context of the feedback loop between banks and sovereigns24.
This result suggests that sovereign bond investors should carefully monitor
the credit derivative market.
22As an example, ETF.com, a publication focused on financial indices, reports in June
2011: ”The two indices have been closely correlated -sovereigns have bailed out banks and
banks are holding government debt.” (the i-Traxx SovX Western Europe includes the 15
most liquid sovereign CDS constracts)
23Geanakoplos (2010) points that the ”midstream” introduction of CDS magnifies the
fall in prices while their introduction from the beginning of the market moves the markets
closer to completeness.
24This result is consistent with previous findings that CDS have destabilizing effects on
the underlying market (Delatte et al. (2012), Palladini and Portes (2011))
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7 Concluding remarks
We estimated the sovereign spread of five peripheral members of the euro-
area using panel non-linear estimation methods. Two important objectives
were to test empirically for the presence of nonlinear dynamics and to iden-
tify what may have driven the non-linear effects during this crisis. Our
PSTR estimation confirms that the model of determination of sovereign
bond spreads is not linear during the European crisis. Investors have priced
the European sovereigns differently since Fall 2010. The contagion from
Greece to the rest of the peripheral countries has probably operated through
simultaneous dynamics in asset prices. On the other hand, our hypothesis
about the role of liquidity shocks is rejected: they do not seem to have had
self-reinforcing effects in peripheral European sovereign pricing.
Our methodology allows us to emphasize individual dynamics inside the
panel. The sovereign bond of Italy, Spain and Portugal have not been driven
by exactly the same dynamics as the bond of Grecce and Portigal. But we
do we find that, in all countries, initial shocks on fundamentals are ampli-
fied when volatility and stress on financial entities increase. In addition our
results reveal that when active investors use credit default swaps indices
to leverage their views on credit risk in the financial sector, this amplifies
changes in the spreads of European peripheral countries. The returns of
peripheral government bonds have been driven up in excess of what the
fundamentals would normally justify by large directional positions in CDS
indices. CDS indices have been broadly used in the securitization process
such as index-CDO. This suggests further exploration of this family of in-
struments.
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Table 1: Selection of the optimal linear model
spec 1 spec 2 spec 3 spec 4 spec 5 spec 6 spec 7 spec 8
Debt− to−GDP −0.127∗∗∗
(−7.83)
−0.128∗∗∗
(−8.73)
−0.165∗∗∗
(−11.19)
−0.213∗∗∗
(−8.56)
−0.128∗∗∗
(−8.11)
−0.165∗∗∗
(−11.19)
−0.089∗∗∗
(−5.62)
−0.115∗∗∗
(−9.10)
Debt− to−GDP 2 0.001∗∗∗
(13.35)
0.001∗∗∗
(13.62)
0.001∗∗∗
(15.96)
0.001∗∗∗
(12.07)
0.001∗∗∗
(14.1)
0.001∗∗∗
(15.96)
0.001∗∗∗
(11.16)
0.001∗∗∗
(14.53)
Fiscal balance 0.025
(1.35)
0.025
(1.35)
0.007
(0.38)
0.113∗∗∗
(3.88)
0.051∗∗∗
(2.73)
0.007
(0.38)
0.07∗∗∗
(3.91)
0.056∗∗∗
(3.06)
Unemployment 0.459∗∗∗
(14.1)
0.457∗∗∗
(14.85)
0.381∗∗∗
(12.26)
0.586∗∗∗
(10.66)
0.362∗∗∗
(10.61)
0.381∗∗∗
(12.26)
0.438∗∗∗
(12.88)
0.377∗∗∗
(11.62)
Unit Labor Cost −0.105∗∗∗
(−6.42)
−0.104∗∗∗
(−6.56)
−0.101∗∗∗
(−5.95)
- - −0.101∗∗∗
(−5.95)
- -
Trade balance −0.004
(−0.10)
- - 0.325∗∗∗
(5.38)
0.055
(1.35)
- 0.05
(1.31)
-
Vix 0.033∗∗∗
(5.22)
0.033∗∗∗
(5.24)
0.034∗∗∗
(5.14)
0.021∗∗
(2.2)
0.016∗∗∗
(2.56)
0.034∗∗∗
(5.14)
0.014∗∗
(2.35)
0.016∗∗
(2.55)
Bid-Ask 3.643∗∗∗
(26.11)
3.639∗∗∗
(26.83)
3.683∗∗∗
(25.44)
- 3.803∗∗∗
(24.77)
3.683∗∗∗
(25.44)
3.77∗∗∗
(26.00)
3.86∗∗∗
(26.11)
Outstanding stock −59.76∗∗∗
(−7.53)
−59.70∗∗∗
(−7.53)
− −65.25∗∗∗
(−4.78)
- - −58.16∗∗∗
(−6.98)
-
Unconventional Monetary Policy 0.0032∗∗
(2.35)
0.0032∗∗
(2.38)
0.0068∗∗∗
(5.14)
0.0040∗
(1.73)
0.0055∗∗∗
(3.98)
0.0068∗∗∗
(5.14)
0.0018
(1.31)
0.0051∗∗∗
(3.80)
AIC 0.197 0.197 0.329 1.284 0.409 0.329 0.294 0.414
Schwarz 0.207 0.207 0.339 1.294 0.419 0.339 0.304 0.424
Note: (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2: Linearity Tests wth a PSTR model
H1: Fire-sale liquidation H2: Feedback loop H3: CDS indices Control
Flight to
liquidity
Flight to
quality
Asymetry
information
AAA/ 10-year Treasury spread 111.4***
10-year Swap spread 78.2*** 78.2***
A/ 10-year Treasury spread 84.8*** 84.8***
High-Yield bond/ Baa spread 70.8*** 70.8*** 70.8***
StockbondsCorr 91.4***
Cross-Section dispersion banks 51.2***
IVOL bank 116.2***
CmaxFin 194.2***
Euribor-ois 119.4***
I-traxx Europe 108.4***
X-over 91.9***
Hivol 79.0***
CDS Snr-Fin 148.3***
CDS Sub-Fin 130.9***
Vstoxx 64.2***
RVOL Germ 29,5***
RVOL Nonfin 41,4***
RVOL Pound 47,9***
RVOL Doll 36,6***
RVOL Yen 39.6***
FTSE 300 111.8***
S&P 350 111.6***
Domestic indices returns 37.7***
Notes: The corresponding LM statistic has an asymptotic χ2(p) distribution under H0. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5%
level and (***): significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3: Estimation of the sovereign bond model with a PSTR model (Full
Sample)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Cmax Fin CDS Snr-Fin CDS Sub-Fi
Linearity Stat 194.2*** 148.3*** 130.9***
Smooth Parameter 111.4 0.266 0.090
Loc Parameter 0.819 239.7 391.6
RSS 175.7 218.5 247.9
Schwarz Crit. -0.485 -0.267 -0.140
Notes: (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***):
significant at the 1% level.
Table 4: Estimation of the sovereign bond model with a PSTR model (two
sub-samples)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Cmax Fin CDS Snr-Fin CDS Sub-Fi
Sub-panel Italy, Spain and Portugal
Linearity Stat 54.2*** 88.2*** 82.8***
Smooth Parameter 40.2 56.9 1.90
Loc Parameter 0.544 135.8 228.0
RSS 26.2 27.1 26.3
Schwarz Crit. -1.68 -1.65 -1.68
Sub-panel Grece and Ireland
Linearity Stat 42.0*** 67.3*** 61.9***
Smooth Parameter 140.8 0.62 7.55
Loc Parameter 0.863 155.2 261.7
RSS 75.1 115.7 110.5
Schwarz Crit. -0.001 0.430 0.384
Notes: (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***):
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Estimates of the sovereign bond model with a PSTR model for
Italy, Spain & Portugal
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CDS Snr Fin CDS Sub Fin CMax Fi
β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2
Debt 0.0212∗∗∗
(3.54)
0.035∗∗∗
(4.28)
0.011∗
(1.94)
0.042∗∗∗
(5.23)
0.129∗∗∗
(5.91)
−0.031∗∗∗
(−3.48)
Squared Debt - - - - −0.0004∗∗∗
(−3.45)
0.0002∗∗∗
(3.48)
Fiscal Balance 0.004
(0.30)
0.154∗∗
(2.40)
0.053∗∗∗
(3.43)
0.137∗∗
(2.12)
−0.053∗
(−1.80)
0.170∗∗∗
(3.90)
Unemployment 0.015
(0.54)
0.112∗∗∗
(2.70)
0.100∗∗∗
(3.50)
0.116∗∗∗
(2.65)
−0.155∗∗∗
(−3.04)
0.179∗∗∗
(4.62)
Unit Labor Cost 0.004
(0.48)
−0.024∗∗
(−2.54)
−0.006
(−0.66)
−0.028∗∗∗
(−2.89)
- -
VIX 0.015∗∗∗
(5.67)
0.035∗∗∗
(4.71)
0.014∗∗∗
(4.9)
0.038∗∗∗
(5.27)
0.021∗∗∗
(5.99)
0.002
(0.25)
Bid-Ask 15.18∗∗∗
(12.9)
−10.44∗∗∗
(−8.14)
43.05∗∗∗
(6.16)
−38.33∗∗∗
(−5.49)
7.71∗∗∗
(10.66)
−2.51∗∗∗
(−3.86)
Outstanding Stock of gov −4.61
(−0.78)
−9.32∗∗∗
(−5.70)
−11.67∗∗
(−1.99)
−9.61∗∗∗
(−6.57)
- -
Unconv. Monet. Policy 0.0074∗∗∗
(4.20)
0.0013
(0.57)
0.0072∗∗∗
(5.79)
0.0003
(−0.15)
0.0071∗∗∗
(7.34)
0.0019
(1.38)
Smooth Parameter γ 60.3 2.18 39.62
Loc Parameter c 135.7 227.9 0.545
Linearity Stat. 96.9∗∗∗ 90.0∗∗∗ 62.0∗∗∗
RSS 27.6 26.81 26.4
Schwarz Crit. -1.685 -1.716 -1.786
Notes: The T-stat in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at
the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.β1 and β2 correspond to the coefficient in Eq (11). β1 is the coefficient
in the first extreme regime . The coefficient in the second extreme regime is β1 + β2.
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Table 6: Estimates of the sovereign bond model with a PSTR model for
Greece & Ireland
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CDS Snr Fin CDS Sub Fin Cmax Fi
β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2
Debt −0.101∗∗∗
(−4.20)
0.086∗∗
(2.13)
−0.114∗∗∗
(−4.99)
0.067
(1.53)
−0.296∗∗∗
(−9.28)
0.242∗∗∗
(4.05)
Squared Debt 0.0005∗∗∗
(4.89)
−0.0004∗
(−1.82)
0.001∗∗∗
(6.50)
0.000
(−1.49)
0.001∗∗∗
(10.89)
0.000
(−0.48)
Fiscal Balance 0.057∗∗∗
(2.63)
0.031
(0.65)
0.056∗∗∗
(2.91)
−0.047
(−0.81)
−0.092∗∗∗
(−2.61)
0.109∗∗
(2.28)
Unemployment 0.57∗∗∗
(8.98)
0.69∗∗∗
(4.30)
0.602∗∗∗
(9.48)
0.639∗∗∗
(3.99)
0.849∗∗∗
(7.85)
0.020
(0.10)
Unit Labor Cost 0.03∗
(1.73)
−0.008∗∗∗
(−4.13)
0.022
(1.45)
−0.082∗∗∗
(−4.02)
−0.036∗∗
(−2.05)
−0.048∗∗
(−2.10)
VIX 0.03∗∗∗
(3.84)
−0.0135
(−0.44)
0.033∗∗∗
(4.53)
−0.007
(−0.23)
0.025∗∗∗
(3.99)
0.019
(0.83)
Bid-Ask 4.55∗∗∗
(3.5)
−1.7
(−1.27)
4.735∗∗∗
(4.19)
−1.904
(−1.61)
2.67∗∗∗
(6.97)
1.175∗∗
(2.05)
Outstanding Stock of gov - - - - 161.9 ∗ ∗∗
(3.31)
−632.3∗∗∗
(−5.96)
Uncon. Monet. Policy 0.026∗∗∗
(6.26)
−0.038∗∗∗
(−5.48)
0.024∗∗∗
(6.49)
−0.033∗∗∗
(−4.49)
0.0275∗∗∗
(7.20)
−0.0459∗∗∗
(−7.20)
Smooth Parameter γ 0.43 6.57 140.8
Loc Parameter c 154.8 262.0 0.863
Linearity Stat. 63.4*** 60.2*** 42.0***
RSS 116.3 111.1 75.1
Schwarz Crit. 0.358 0.312 -0.001
Notes: The T-stat in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at
the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.β1 and β2 correspond to the coefficient in Eq (11). β1 is the coefficient
in the first extreme regime . The coefficient in the second extreme regime is β1 + β2.
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Figure 1: Dependent and Explanatory Variables
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Figure 2: Threshold Variables
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